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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to examine changing discursive conceptualizations of
technology transfer mechanisms for speeding up innovation in Germany and the US
since World War II with particular emphasis on universities. According to our analysis,
the concepts of technology transfer are getting more and more complex, taking oﬀ from
a linear model of innovation to a more complex model allowing for networking and
entrepreneurial activities of the universities themselves. We suggest that the discourses
in both countries can be framed employing three ideal-typical models: the information
and documentation model, the cooperation model, and the blurring of boundaries model.
In addition to these similarities, we also discuss diﬀerences that can be traced back to
broader political cultures in which technology transfer is embedded. Both similarities
and diﬀerences allow for a comparative perspective which is not limited to the countries
analyzed here.
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Introduction
All over the globe, there are debates about the increasingly close rela-
tionship between academia and industry (see, for example, Slaughter
and Leslie 1997; Etzkowitz et al. 1998; Etzkowitz 2000; Slaughter and
Rhoades 2004). Yet, despite arguments about international convergence
around new academic-private partnerships, higher education systems
continue to diﬀer in important ways. For example, the United States
and German university systems exhibit obvious structural diﬀerences in
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size, governing structures and internal organization. Moreover, they are
embedded in very diﬀerent cultural traditions. During the second half of
the 19th century, the United States higher education system in large part
began to incorporate ‘‘service’’ to its socio-economic and socio-political
environments as a third academic mission. Later on, it was explicitly
seen as a resource for military-related industrial development and it
rapidly expanded following World War II. In contrast, the German
system, modeled after the 19th century reformist ideals of Wilhelm von
Humboldt, has traditionally been characterized by a strong rejection of
industry ‘‘interference’’ in higher education. After World War II, as a
reaction against the wartime mobilization of university resources by the
Nazis, the von Humboldt ideals had been reaﬃrmed. In this paper, we
explore the question of academia and industry ties within an explicitly
comparative context.
Speciﬁcally, we examine academic–industry ties within the American
and German contexts, asking: is the discourse on the ‘‘entrepreneurial
university’’ converging across national contexts? Or, do important na-
tional diﬀerences persist in contemporary discourses about the entre-
preneurial university? Based on the analysis of American and German
policy documents,1 we develop three ideal-typical models of ‘‘technol-
ogy transfer’’ across the academic and industry divide, which can be
found in both national contexts: (1) the information and documentation
(I & D) model; (2) the cooperation model and (3) the blurring of
boundaries (BoB) model. We trace the historical rise of each of these
models in the United States and Germany, noting the diﬀerent phases of
their (discursive) adoption in each nation’s higher education system.
Our ﬁndings suggest that discourses about academia and industry ties
exhibit both transnational and national features.2 Though we ﬁnd
strikingly similar general models in both countries, the pace of their
adoption and their speciﬁc content diﬀer strongly. As it is our aim to
frame university–industry relations within the broader context of sci-
ence in society, we see how a currently hotly debated issue in the ﬁeld of
higher education has been shaped by more general discourses on
knowledge, innovation, and the societal utilization of research. This
implies to begin our analysis with eﬀorts to improve the transfer of
knowledge and technology from public research institutions. These ef-
forts, which provide the background for what we label ‘‘information
and documentation model’’, can be seen as a forerunner for contem-
porary political discourses on university-industry relations.
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The information and documentation model
According to the I & D model, the key problem in linking up science
and industry is the accelerating rate at which scientiﬁc knowledge is
produced. The solution to this problem of knowledge ‘‘superabun-
dance’’ is the creation of information infrastructures that make
knowledge available in a methodical, technologically advanced and
modern way. Speciﬁcally, new infrastructures are supposed to ensure
that targeted actors eﬃciently negotiate in an information-rich envi-
ronment and receive timely and relevant knowledge, information and
data. In addition, new information infrastructures are expected to re-
duce the waste of time and resources that results from the reinvention of
already-existing technologies. Thus, the I & D model is a model of
rationalization in the context of information ‘‘superabundance’’, with a
prescriptive emphasis on the creation of new infrastructures designed to
improve the ﬂow of knowledge across diﬀerent institutions.
A few further features of the I & D model are worth noting. First, the
I & D model of science-industry relations is linear: knowledge genera-
tion is followed by dissemination and then utilization. The transfer of
existing knowledge across science-industry boundaries takes place
without any transformation of that knowledge. At most, information is
condensed, or when necessary, translated. Second, the I & D model does
not assume personal contact between scientists and industry. A scien-
tist’s primary role is that of knowledge producer, although he may be
asked to avoid ‘‘unnecessary’’ or redundant publications and to provide
titles and abstracts that may be easily understood by others (for
example, President’s Advisory Committee 1963). Even here, specialized
agencies and archival journals, rather than the scientists themselves, are
expected to undertake the bulk of the required work.
The German Case
Arguably, the I & D model has been the dominant model in German
discourse on ‘‘technology transfer’’ issues since the 1960s. Specialized
journals, for example, ‘‘Nachrichten fu¨r Dokumentation’’, which was
established in 1950, reinforced the I & D model within the domestic
context. The ﬁrst major national public policy statement reﬂecting I &
D commitments, however, did not emerge until 1962, when the federal
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accounting oﬃce (‘‘Bundesrechnungshof’’) issued the following state-
ment:
‘‘The solution to the problem of how latent knowledge can be
brought to interested parties is essential for the competitiveness of
modern, industrial communities and so falls under the purview of
government responsibility. The retrieval of knowledge . . . is a tool to
considerably improve performance in science, the economy and
public administration’’ (Bundesrechnungshof 1962: 23).
Even following this statement, little was done until the ﬁrst major
federal government program was introduced in the mid seventies. The
focal point of the I & D program 74–77 (BMFT 1975) was the creation of
large, specialized information centers (‘‘Fachinformationszentren’’), un-
der the auspices of the federal government. The general idea of informa-
tion services remained central in the following years; even though a shift
towards amoremarket-oriented view of information services emphasized
that the role of such innovation oﬃces was a private, not public,
responsibility (Bundesrechnungshof 1983; BMFT 1985). Finally, in the
1990s, ‘‘information policy’’ was refocussed on information and com-
munication technologies (BMBF 1996, 2002) within the context of an
emerging ‘‘information society’’ for example, as in the Bangemann Re-
port (High-Level Group on the Information Society 1994).
Since the 1970s, there has been a consistent focus on small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) as a target group of I & D activities.
Before, technology policy focused more or less exclusively on big
business and big science (BMwF 1969). Compared to large companies,
SMEs are seen as informationally disadvantaged and therefore in need
of specialized assistance concerning information mediation and dis-
semination. Thus, in addition to more centralized public and private
structures, decentralized mediating infrastructures, including diverse
counseling agencies, were established with the explicit aim of oﬀering
SMEs ‘‘qualiﬁed dialogue with a knowledgeable partner’’ (Ockenfeld
1984: 44f). That is, specialized agencies sought to inform SMEs of
industry-relevant technological developments, through targeted coun-
seling in the SME client’s sector of interest. In conformity with the I &
D model more generally, however, such agencies did not coordinate
personal contacts between producers and users of scientiﬁc knowledge –
nor did they incorporate the idea of feedback loops between diﬀerent
stages of the innovation process.
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The American case
In the United States, the Sputnik Shock is usually regarded as the starting
point of modern I & D activities. (Johnson and Teske 1997: 46; see also
Krieger 1987: 258). On the institutional side, this event resulted in two
main innovations, as the American government sought to respond to the
Soviet colonization of space. First, the state founded several institutions
and, relatedly, developed new legislation designed to spur on innovation
through ‘‘technology transfer’’ between academic and industry. Notably,
the National Science Foundation created the ‘‘Oﬃce of Science Infor-
mation’’ in 1958 and, in the same year, Congress established a Science
Information Council and the 1958 Defense Education Act to expand
technology-related education and establish the Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Administration (DARPA) (Johnson and Teske 1997: 46).
Second, the federal government increased funding for research and
development – a particularly remarkable development given the already-
strong levels of federal research and development support post World
War II. This increased funding led to calls for greater public account-
ability, and subsequently, the creation of I & D agencies to facilitate the
public diﬀusion of state-funded research and encourage its commercial
applications. For example, NACA, later NASA, was given an explicit
mandate to publicly disseminate space research in 1959, following con-
cerns about the ‘‘practical’’ implications (that is, commercial applica-
bility) of space research. Following criticisms by Congress, the NASA
took a further step by declassifying ‘‘uncritical’’ research outcomes and
making them freely available through ‘‘regional dissemination centers’’
all over the United States. Thus, as in Germany, the United States
administration actively fostered the I & D model of technology transfer,
typically by establishing federally funded research institutions and then
encouraging them to share the results of ‘‘pure’’ scientiﬁc research with
industry counterparts.
As in the German case, the I & D model was explicitly used as the
basis for formulating state policy concerning research, at least on oc-
casion. For example, Eugene Foley of the Small Business Administra-
tion argued, in the mid-1960s, that the American federal government:
‘‘has an obligation to develop a workable system of utilizing this
enormous reservoir of scientiﬁc information so that its beneﬁts can
be transmitted to business both large and small in order to provide
the ingredients necessary for an accelerated growth in our civilian
economy’’ (cited in Rosenbloom 1965: 6).
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Thus, relevant American parties tended to conceive of basic research
as contributing to a ‘‘reservoir’’ of knowledge, which simply needed to
be tapped by industry to ensure national economic progress. This
conﬁdence in the transferability of academic knowledge to the industrial
domain would wane with the advent of the ‘‘cooperation model’’ of
technology transfer: the translation eﬀort that is necessary to transfer
knowledge from one context to another becomes a recurring theme in
the new model.
The cooperation model
Studies of technology transfer that were conducted under the I & D
model suggested the limitations of such a model for speeding up the
innovation process. In particular, the idea that research outcomes more
or less automatically ‘‘fall-out’’ or ‘‘spill-over’’ from the academic to
industrial domain was met with increasing scepticism, as researchers
pointed out that many potential users, especially SMEs but also ‘‘or-
dinary people’’, have diﬃculty understanding ‘‘raw’’ scientiﬁc infor-
mation (see, for example, Myers 1966). Partly, this is because scientiﬁc
jargon is hard to understand for non-scientists, so that a translation
eﬀort is necessary. But, in more general terms, the fact that potential
users have access to documented knowledge is not, in itself, enough to
stimulate innovation based on this knowledge.
Taking this insight into account, the cooperation model emphasizes
that science and technology transfer can only be successful if scientists
and practitioners actively exchange their ideas through immediate per-
sonal contact. This may be achieved informally or formally, for exam-
ple, through personnel exchanges between research institutions and
industrial partners. Mediators (like technology transfer oﬃces) shall
help to establish contacts and to clear up misunderstandings. Thus, in
this model, actual or perceived ‘‘cultural gaps’’ between science and the
economy are seen as the key problem. These gaps can only be bridged
by personal trust.
In contrast to the I & D model, which implies a linear and hierar-
chical process of transmitting existing knowledge, the cooperation
model understands ‘‘transfer’’ as a dialogue among partners from dif-
ferent institutional backgrounds. Transfer is no longer conceptualized
as a one way street. Rather, scientists engage in cooperation, learn
about the technological needs of their (industry) partners and redraw
their research agenda accordingly. Thus, the cooperation model
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introduces an element of feedback even though scientists are still seen as
the primary knowledge producers in the exchange.
Notably, although the cooperation model stresses the institutional
integrity of science (and of economy as well), it implies an important
change of the role of science in the utilization of scientiﬁc knowledge.
Scientists, as transfer partners, and scientiﬁc institutions, as mediators,
are expected to get actively involved in the process of technology
transfer.
The German Case
The cooperation model gained prominence in German science and
technology policy during the second half of the 1970s and dominated
technology transfer discourse during the 1980s. During this period,
oﬃcial statements of major science organizations relied explicitly upon
the cooperation approach to academic–industry ties (Wissenschaftsrat
1986, Hochschulverband 1991). Notably, this meant a shift in the per-
ception of university teaching and research, with a stronger emphasis on
their role in resolving the ‘‘practical’’ problems of the economy. At the
same time, the model upheld a clear distinction between producers and
appliers of knowledge (or to put it another way: between clients and
servers). In 1986, the German Research Council characteristically ar-
gued that:
‘‘By cooperating with the economy, higher education institutions
gain to a larger extent the opportunity to orient teaching and
research to practical developments and needs. Research outcomes
can be brought to the economy faster, and the innovative potential
of the higher education institutions can be emphasized more. This
helps the higher education institutions to better fulﬁll their primary
missions in research and teaching as well’’ (Wissenschaftsrat
1986: 14).
Historically, then, the cooperation model was very much embedded
in concepts of the regionalization of the university and in those of
broader changes in the national economic structure (‘‘Strukturwan-
del’’). At that time, ‘‘innovation’’ became a key concept in German
discourses on the role of technology in economic development. For
instance, although the notion of a technological gap between Europe
and the United States had already been discussed in the late sixties
(OECD 1968) and the term ‘‘innovation’’ can be found in information
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policy papers of the mid-1970s (see, for example, BMFT 1975), it is not
until the Commission on Economic and Social Change in 1977 and the
federal government paper on technology policy for SMEs in 1978 that
innovation is consistently emphasized as the key to industry competi-
tiveness, particularly for SMEs (Kommission fu¨r wirtschaftlichen und
sozialen Wandel 1977, esp. pp. 255–264; BMFT/BFWi 1978). Both
papers describe cooperative technology transfer as a means of advanc-
ing innovation and emphasize the role of specialized agencies in this
process:
‘‘This [the promotion of specialized technology transfer oﬃces]
would be a decisive contribution to the modernization of the
national economy and would facilitate future processes of structural
adaptation’’ (Kommission fu¨r wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Wandel
1977: 287).
In practice, technology transfer oﬃces have been found in almost
every university in Germany since the late 1970s. Although classical I &
D activities have always been a central task of university transfer oﬃces,
it became apparent that information sharing is only a ﬁrst step, pre-
ceeding more active cooperation between academic and industrial
partners.
By the late 1970s, the mission of transfer oﬃces, always marked by a
strong regional orientation (Kru¨cken 2003), became explicitly tied to
university regionalization projects. Early project reports insist upon the
necessity of linking up cooperative technology transfer, innovation, and
the structural changes in the regional economy (for example Allesch et
al. 1979, Kayser 1981, ITZ 1984). In addition, during the same period,
the so-called ‘‘science shops’’, oﬀering knowledge transfer services to
ordinary people and non-proﬁt organizations, were established. While
depicting themselves as an anti-capitalist and emancipatory counter-
movement to transfer oﬃces, science shops echo their ‘‘capitalist’’
counterparts insofar as they focus on the dialogue between culturally
diﬀerent partners of equal status in a given region (academic research-
ers, nonproﬁt organizations, and ordinary people). They emphasize the
increasing relevance of science in society, in general terms, and try to
direct science to the needs of external constituencies.3
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some German researchers appeared
to ﬁnd the idea of an increasing industrial or, more broadly, ‘‘societal’’
relevance of academic research appealing. This was due to a common,
but in hindsight false, belief that changes in demographic structure
would lead to a dramatic decrease in university enrollments during the
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1980s, hence making universities the potential object of down-sizing
activities (Webler 1984). Thus, university researchers and administrators
embraced the idea of new goals and tasks that helped to legitimize
ongoing state support for higher education institutions (Neusel and
Teichler 1980). In sum, the development of science and technology
transfer oﬃces appeared attractive to parties seeking to proactively
reaﬃrm the ongoing relevance of universities when student enrollment
ﬁgures were supposed to drop.
The American case
The late 1960s and early 1970s brought about an important change in
university functions, albeit one that was somewhat overshadowed by the
students’ rebellion of the same period. Speciﬁcally, the state-university-
honeymoon (Roy 1972: 956) – and with this, the relative distance of
academic science and industrial research – came to an end. ‘‘Honey-
moon’’ is meant to describe the period of far-reaching state funding for
universities which we described above. An unintended eﬀect thereof is a
decrease of universities’ eﬀorts to apply for other funding sources:
‘‘At one time, industry was a prime supporter and defender of
academic institutions. During the last two decades, however – while
universities fell into dependence on government – industry and
universities have been estranged. . . . A closer cooperation of
academic scientists and dynamic elements of industry could lead
to eﬀective actions’’ (Abelson 1974: 1251; see also Brodsky et al.
1980: 9).
As this quote illustrates, there were broad calls for a renewed role for
industry in the ﬁnancing of university research. In general terms, in the
context of declining state funding levels, which created new challenges
for the completion of existing research projects, industry–academic ties
were seen as a possible alternative source of ﬁnancing (NSF 1982: 3;
Dedijer 1970). In this situation, the idea of ‘‘service’’ was speciﬁcally
evoked as the necessary ‘‘third mission’’ of universities.
‘‘The initial dilemma in attempting to meet the new demands being
made on our universities results from an uncertainty about our
purpose. For anyone associated with the university, the problem
revolves around that black pit called service. It is particularly
appealing in the era of large, perhaps overactive, universities to deﬁne
our fundamental missions as basic research and teaching. It seems
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doubtful, however, that we can demote service to a second-class
position. President James Perkins of Cornell views service diﬀerently,
as a third and equal mission of the university. Whether it is what we
want, it is much closer to what we have’’ (Kash 1968: 1315).
Thus, ‘‘service’’ is re-emphasized as one of the core missions of
universities. There is, in this way, a commitment, to broader public
‘‘accountability’’ in the form of a marked ‘‘service’’ orientation, which
includes renewed industry–academic ties. It is clearly this latter aspect in
which we are interested in this paper, and which became subject of
political interest in the following years.
Along similar lines, in his message to the congress on March 16,
1972, President Nixon urged the National Science Foundation to
‘‘determine eﬀective ways of stimulating non-Federal investment in re-
search and development and of improving the application of research
and development results’’ (NSF 1982: 15). In this way, declining state
funding was linked both to the need for increased academic–industry
collaboration and to increased expectations that academic research
justify existing public ﬁnances by producing results directly beneﬁciary
to the national economy.
The National Science Foundation reacted to these new expectations
by initiating experimental programs to foster university–industry
interaction, notably including the Cooperative Research Centers and
the Innovation Centers, established in 1973, followed by the University–
Industry Cooperative Research Projects in 1978 (NSF 1982: 16; 9; Asian
Productivity Organization 1989: 4; Gray and Walters 1998). Despite
these eﬀorts, a 1978 domestic policy review by the Carter administration
found university–industry cooperation in research ‘‘subject to
improvement’’.
Ultimately, the new interest in academic–industry ties was expressed
in two seminal pieces of legislation, both oriented to the new ‘‘practical’’
role for universities in the national economic project, but nevertheless
emphasizing diﬀerent aspects of this role: the Stevenson–Wydler Act,
established to support university–industry cooperation; and the Bayh–
Dole Act, enabling universities to hold title to inventions funded by
federal government sources and thus fostering the entrepreneurial
activity of the university itself. While we will deal with the latter one in
the following section on the blurring of boundaries model, we will now
take a closer look at the Stevenson-Wydler Act, which we interpret as a
centerpiece of the cooperation model. In the paragraph on ‘‘congres-
sional ﬁndings’’, the act states:
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‘‘Many new discoveries and advances in science occur in universities
and Federal laboratories, while the application of this new knowl-
edge to commercial and useful public policies depends largely upon
actions by business and labor. Cooperation among academia,
Federal laboratories, labor, and industry, in such forms as technol-
ogy transfer, personnel exchange, joint research projects, and others,
should be renewed, expanded, and strengthened’’ (x3701 (3)).
This quote nicely encapsulates the major premises of the cooperation
model, including the notion of give and take between universities and
industries and the form that this cooperation should take – namely,
technology transfer and joint research. In general terms, the Stevenson–
Wydler Technology Act prototypically laments a lack of comprehensive
national policy to enhance technological innovation for commercial and
public purposes, while calling for renewed cooperation among acade-
mia, federal laboratories, and industry through establishing cooperative
research center (xx3701–3702).4 It also requires federal laboratories to
establish technology transfer oﬃces.
The Stevenson–Wydler Act is the ﬁrst in a series of legislative steps
towards ‘‘cooperation’’ in this era.5 Nevertheless it should be noted that
cooperation does not imply equal input by academics and industrial
partners into the cooperative agreement. The roles of the partners in-
volved are clearly separated, as the following quote from the National
Science Foundation illustrates:
‘‘In particular, the Government will support research activities that
result in new knowledge from which commercial technology may be
ultimately derived. However, it is uniquely the industry’s role to
translate this knowledge into commercial processes and products, and
to support research and development where necessary to complement
that supported by the Federal Government’’ (NSF 1982: 6).
Bozeman (2000: 633) points to this ‘‘division of labor’’ even more
clearly:
‘‘The cooperative technology policies . . . depend greatly on univer-
sities and government laboratories. The logic is simple: universities
and government labs make, industry takes.’’
In piecemeal fashion, new acts were added to extend the Stevenson–
Wydler Act, which was widely criticized as ‘‘toothless’’ since Congress
initially withheld necessary funding, and because technology transfer
oﬃces were often introduced on a ‘‘ceremonial’’ basis only, for example,
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being (inadequately) staﬀed by one part-time employee, and without
any formal agenda (Rahm et al. 1988: 970).
In 1982, the Small Business Innovation Development Act was
passed, requiring federal agencies to provide set-aside funds for small
business R & D. In 1984, the National Cooperative Research Act was
legislated, supporting the idea of collaborative research between ﬁrms,
federal laboratories, and universities by introducing an exemption from
anti-trust legislation. The 1986 Federal Technology Transfer Act
authorized national laboratories to enter into cooperative R & D
agreements with private ﬁrms and to negotiate the licensing agreements6
and the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act established
centers for transferring manufacturing technology. The 1989 National
Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act extended the 1986 Technol-
ogy Transfer Act to all federal laboratories; and the 1991 Defense
Authorization Act linked defense laboratories with state and local
governments and small businesses (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Bozeman
2000). In this way, the acts mentioned above extended the idea of
cooperation between universities and private laboratories.
The blurring of boundaries model
While the cooperation model takes for granted – and even emphasizes –
clear institutional boundaries between science and the economy, the
BoB model assumes that these boundaries are becoming increasingly
permeable, diﬀuse and, in some cases, ‘‘blurred’’.
Analytically, this model has two variants. The ﬁrst focuses on the
emerging entrepreneurial activity of the university, which is understood
as an economic actor in its own right, engaging in licensing activities
and/or fostering spin-oﬀs. In becoming entrepreneurial the university
transcends its institutional identity and undermines traditional bound-
aries.
The second variant emphasizes the embeddedness of academic
knowledge production in a comprehensive innovation process, which is
regarded as highly complex and is often described with metaphors of
systems or networks. This model highlights, for example, the interaction
of the systems’ components or feedback loops.
These network features clearly contrast with the cooperation model’s
more simple and linear structure. The cooperation model focuses on
mediated and straightforward – mostly – dyadic relation between sci-
entists and practitioners. In contrast, the more complex network model
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makes it harder or even impossible to diﬀerentiate a well-deﬁned aca-
demic role from an economic one. As a result, also in the network
variant of the BoB model the institutional boundaries of the economy
and of the academia are blurred.
The German case
In German discourse, the BoB model emerged in the 1990s, particularly
in federal government and the European Union policy papers. Science –
at least in part – is now interpreted as an element of a comprehensive
innovation process, for which the network form seems to be the most
appropriate structure:
‘‘Research is not an end in itself. In the long run, research should
lead to economic growth and new jobs. All parts of the innovation
process, starting with basic research up to the diﬀusion of new
products and procedures, should be linked up’’ (BMWi/BMBF
2002: 35).
Indeed, science and technology related policies now routinely postu-
late the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of heterogeneous networks. Networks
of all kinds – regional clusters, innovation networks, excellence networks
and above all competence networks – are promoted as the means to
‘‘secure the competitiveness of Germany in the international competi-
tion’’ (BMBF 2000: 60). Likewise, the European Union explicitly sup-
ports networks through its ﬁnancing of ‘‘networks of excellence’’, and
implicitly supports them bymaking the participation of institutions from
diﬀerent member states a prerequisite for European funding.
The widespread belief in the centrality of network structures to
successful technology transfer is expressed in condensed form in the
slogan of the internet portal ‘‘kompetenznetze.de’’, an initiative of the
federal research department: ‘‘Innovations require Networks’’. The
technology transfer oﬃces of universities increasingly engage in net-
working activities as well. Indeed, for some of them networking with
other networkers even seems to become the ultimate raison d’eˆtre
(Kru¨cken and Meier 2003).
In addition to the emphasis on complex networks some cautious steps
towards the entrepreneurial university can be observed in German dis-
course as well. For example, technology transfer policy in this period
focuses on two central issues: patents and spin-oﬀs, both of which imply
the economic activity of individual scientists or universities. The extent of
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the debate around patents and spin-oﬀs is symptomatic of an ‘‘econo-
mized’’ perception of the scientiﬁc sphere. Nevertheless, in contrast to the
belief in networks the idea of entrepreneurialism is still contested as the
following quote from a key professors’ lobby organization shows:
‘‘Science transfer is cooperation with enterprises. The scientists as
entrepreneur must be an exception’’ (Hochschulverband 1991: 215).
Spin-oﬀs are fostered by diﬀerent activities undertaken by the federal
government (for example the program EXIST) and by several states
(‘‘La¨nder’’). In addition, they become an important ﬁeld of activity for
transfer oﬃces as well (Meier 2001). Until recently, due to the so called
teacher exemption clause (‘‘Hochschullehrerprivileg’’) the title to all
potentially patentable innovations belonged to the individual re-
searcher. In 2002 the legal situation changed and the universities became
responsible for patenting activities. This development changes the very
nature of transfer policies towards patenting. While traditional policies
reduced technology transfer oﬃces to centers giving legal and economic
advice to individual inventors, the new law brings a new task to uni-
versities, allowing and encouraging them to become actively entrepre-
neurial at the organizational level. Since existing transfer oﬃces do not
meet the professional requirements for licensing activities, new infra-
structures are created to fulﬁll the new institutional tasks.
Alongside organizational innovations in universities that reﬂect the
new BoB model, there are activities on a larger scale as well. For in-
stance, the federal government is now funding patent exploitation
agencies (‘‘PVA’’) in each of the German states. Yet it remains an open
question whether or not these structures will be self-sustaining after the
initial federal funding runs out.
The American case
In the United States, the blurring of boundaries model takes the shape
of the entrepreneurial university. As we have seen, the models presented
in this paper are not adopted in strict chronological order: the uptake of
a new model does not imply the end of its predecessor. This holds
especially true for the cooperation model and the blurring of boundaries
model, as both approaches, which imply a somewhat diﬀerent under-
standing of the role of universities with regard to the economy, are
supported simultaneously.
The Bayh–Dole Act that we see as a milestone of the BoB model was
passed in 1980. That very year the Stevenson–Wydler Act, which we
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interpreted as an important expression of the cooperation model, came
into existence, too. Probably it is this simultaneity that explains why
American authors like Slaughter and Leslie (1997) and Bozeman (2000)
do not distinguish between models of cooperation and those of
entrepreneurship incorporated in these acts. In fact, these authors as-
sume that both acts (and all follow-ups on the Stevenson–Wydler Act)
are driven by the same spirit.
The Bayh–Dole Act entitled universities and SMEs to patent and to
issue licenses to inventions developed with federal funding. This Act is
commonly recognized as the ﬁrst signiﬁcant initiative in the creation of
the entrepreneurial university, thrusting university research into the
proﬁt-making arena. Or, as Slaughter and Leslie (1997: 46) put it: ‘‘In a
very real sense the Bayh-Dole Act encouraged academic capitalism.’’
Howard H. Bremer points out in 2001 that the Bayh–Dole Act was ‘‘the
ﬁnal step in establishing the strong university–industry connection
which nowadays exists in the United States’’ and that ‘‘today, univer-
sities operate in an economic climate which . . . is entrepreneurially
based’’ (http://www.nasulgc.org/cott/bayh-dohl/bremer_speech.htm,
July 13, 2004).
Thus the Bayh-Dole Act was a particularly important symbolic event
because many diﬀerent actors whose opinions otherwise diﬀer, converge
in their assessment of its importance for university/industry relations.
Yet, some authors challenge the assumption that the Act is the
crucial step towards entrepreneurial activity. For example, they suggest
that the Act has had little real eﬀect on university patenting and
licensing, and that it was only one among other factors contributing to
the related increase in the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, Mowery
et al. 2001).
Nevertheless, the Bayh–Dole Act marks the shift towards a new
model in American discourse, though perhaps not in practice. In this
model, universities are seen as relevant economic actors, interested in
selling the fruit of their research work via patenting and selling licenses,
and by spawning start-up companies. This ‘‘capitalization of knowl-
edge’’ (Etzkowitz 1994, 1998) leads to new policy topics and sometimes
disputes (cp. Matkin 1997: 95).7
Indeed, with the advent of the entrepreneurial university a new ideal
emerges: A strong indicator for excellent research used in the Science
and Engineering Indicators is research that leads to patents as well as
publications in – preferably basic – science journals, and both are seen
as ‘‘performance’’ indicators for university researchers (see NSB 2004:
O-8).
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While claiming that the existence of the entrepreneurial university
has become a truism in American higher education discourse, there is
– compared to the German case – only scant political attention to
complex innovation networks. Nevertheless, actual network-like
cooperation practices, which are in particular highlighted for the Silicon
Valley and its heterogeneous actors (Stanford University, venture cap-
italists, industrial ﬁrms etc.) may contribute to the perception of blur-
ring boundaries as well (see, for example, Saxenian 1994, Kenney 2000).
Discussion
Following from our analysis, it is clear that the debate about how to
spur the transfer of knowledge and technology between academia and
industry is not a recent phenomenon. In the United States, the discus-
sion began in the late 1950s, and in Germany in the early 1960s. From
that time on, as we have argued, not one model but three diﬀerent
models of technology transfer have been advocated in both countries. In
the I & D model, the emphasis was on ﬁnding more eﬀective ways of
making information about knowledge and technology available to its
potential users. Here, academia’s knowledge base was seen simply as a
reservoir in need of better documentation, and it was imagined that
advancements in information technology would suﬃce to bridge the gap
between academia and industry. Similarly, the I & D model has a rel-
atively straightforward understanding of knowledge, based on the
assumption that knowledge may be transferred from one context to
another, without being transformed by this transfer. Thus, the logic was
that of a linear and hierarchical diﬀusion from academia to industry,
reﬂecting the scientiﬁc optimism of that era.
In the 1970s, however, a more sceptical view of technology transfer
emerged in both countries, leading to the emergence of what we have
called the cooperation model. Trust in I & D activities waned, and the
hitherto unquestioned linear and hierarchical model of knowledge
transfer was criticized. The new model emphasized cultural diﬀerences
between academia and industry, with the consequence that trust-
building – through direct interactions, personnel exchanges, and medi-
ating agencies – became the dominant issue. While this model explicitly
recognized diﬀerences between the academic and industrial contexts, it
did not question those diﬀerences. Thus, the cooperation model
emphasized a much more active and dialogue-oriented role for both
academic and industrial researchers, across the diﬀerent institutional
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contexts, as well as for the organizations in which they are embedded.
Furthermore, both in the United States and in Germany the whole
discourse on academia and industry links became more encompassing
and dramatic in tone. Both institutional contexts were now seen as
contributing to innovation, which in turn was seen as of central
importance for the economic competitiveness and, hence, economic
survival of both countries.
Finally, the blurring of boundaries model took shape, appearing in the
1980s, in the United States, and in the 1990s, in Germany. In this model,
the blurring of clear-cut institutional boundaries between academia and
industry is seen as a central feature in the overall innovation process, an
approach translated into two distinct policy ideas. On the one hand, the
university is conceptualized as an economic actor, and entrepreneurial
activities not only of individual faculty, but of the organization as a whole
are encouraged. This approach is in obvious contrast to the cooperation
model, where the institutional distinctiveness of universities as compared
to economic ﬁrms is recognized but not treated as somethingwhich had to
be overcome. On the other hand, a network-structure is sought, to facil-
itate the linking up of universities, other research organizations, diﬀerent
kinds of ﬁrms, and political agencies, all of which are seen as diﬀerent
nodes in the innovation process. This clearly marks a strong departure
from the linear approach of the ﬁrst two models, as complex interactions
and feedback loops are highlighted.
Nevertheless, similarities between both national systems should not be
overdrawn. Our analysis has brought attention to equally strong diﬀer-
ences. While in Germany the three models succeed each other in a clear
chronological order, the American picture is more strongly marked by
overlapping models, in which, beginning with the I &Dmodel, aspects of
subsequent models are added in piecemeal fashion. In addition, some
more speciﬁc diﬀerences have becomeobvious.According to our analysis,
rules and regulations are the most important elements framing the
American discourse. In particular, from 1980 onwards, the Bayh–Dole
Act served as a focal point for all relevant actors dealing with university–
industry relations, reﬂecting, but in the contemporary context, long-
standing American interest in the relevance of universities to economic
performance. Such a discursive reference point seems to be missing in
Germany. Here, instead, a broader cultural and political debate on the
appropriate role of universities in innovation systems emerged, in which –
up to the 1990s – the political and academic elites were strongly divided on
whether universities should become entrepreneurial or not.
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Another important diﬀerence between the two national contexts is
the role played by the concept of the network. The idea of the network
seems to play a much stronger role in Germany, where it has acquired a
myth-like status in current discourse. In contrast, in the United States,
innovation networks, though heavily discussed and promoted in
academic discourses, are signiﬁcantly less visible in political discourse
and related programs and legislation. This diﬀerence seems to reﬂect the
embeddedness of university–industry relations in diﬀerent cultural set-
tings and, ultimately, polities. The assumption that heterogeneous net-
works are superior to other forms of exchange and cooperation may be
due to an emphasis, in German political culture, on interest mediation
and the inclusion of diﬀerent, even marginal actors. For example, in
Germany, there is an emphasis on broad participation of SMEs and
regional political agencies of all kinds, which cannot be found in the
United States. This tendency in Germany is further fueled by the
European Union, which is also heavily promoting the network idea
through a variety of programs and by making the participation of dif-
ferent institutions from diﬀerent member states obligatory for European
research funding. In this, the global trend towards closer relationships
between academia and industry is mediated by national political and
cultural traditions, which continue to exhibit marked diﬀerences. Thus,
although both the German and American national discourses show a
common trend towards the blurring of boundaries between academia
and industry, in an individualist polity, like the American one, the
entrepreneurial university and the entrepreneurial researcher have be-
come the dominant role model, while in a ‘‘neo-corporatist’’ polity, like
the German one, a comprehensive innovation network is seen as the
way to success. This opens up interesting questions concerning inter-
national comparisons in higher education and innovation policy, which
go far beyond the cases we analyzed here.
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Notes
1. We examined written documents of central science and political organizations, legal
texts, and research journals.
2. These discourses are embedded in broader societal developments which are to be
analyzed from a macro-sociological perspective. Here, one can draw, for example,
upon neo-marxist models of political economy, or on the world-polity model in
sociology’s neo-institutionalism. For an attempt to analyze technology transfer dis-
courses from these competing perspectives see Coburn 2007).
3. In Germany, however, science shops did not gain much importance in contrast to
other countries, especially the Netherlands (Kleijer 1984). Currently they seem to be
rediscovered by the European Union. The alleged comeback of this institution is
described by Fischer et al. (2004).
4. The emergence of the cooperative model does not imply the end of information and
documentation eﬀorts. This is nicely illustrated by the act itself, as it also aims at
enhancing information and documentation mechanisms (x3705a (4)).
5. Obviously this holds true for the 1980s only. The ﬁrst legislative action on cooper-
ation is the Morrill Act of 1862, through which land-grant universities were estab-
lished.
6. The ability to licensing itself is part of the BoB model, though.
7. The ‘‘economized’’ perception of universities is mirrored by ‘‘economized’’ language.
AUTM points out in their FAQ (http://www.autm.net/pubs/survey/qa.html, July 13,
2004) that revenues out of licensing help advancing research and education ‘‘through
reinvestment in the academic enterprise’’, and the Government University Industry
Roundtable is created to ‘‘improve the productivity of a nation’s research enterprise’’
(GUIRR 1990: ii).
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